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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the practical importance of a critical but under-explored interpretation of a provision
in the Affordable Care Act (ACA): whether “affordable” refers to the cost of single coverage alone,
or to family or single coverage as applicable to the worker, in determining the employer’s mandated
coverage requirement and workers’ (and their dependents’) access to subsidized exchange coverage.
Since the average annual total premium for family coverage is substantially higher than that for single
coverage (on average $12,298 vs. $4,386 in 2008) this is a non-trivial distinction.
Using data on workers from the Current Population Survey merged with estimates of employer and
exchange policy premiums, we investigate the impact of the affordability decision on the fraction of
workers who could then access exchange coverage subsidies and on the correspondingly lower employer
sponsored insurance (ESI) coverage rates. We do via a series of calculations for each worker that first
shows the financial incentives at stake in deciding between ESI and subsidized exchange coverage.
We then show how many of those who stand to gain from exchange coverage could do so under the
two different affordability rules and different levels of employee contributions. Finally, we show the
extent to which a single affordability rule would cause low-income workers with families to fall into
a “no-man’s land” with no source of affordable family coverage.
We estimate that choosing a family affordability rule could initially lead to as many as 1.3 million
more workers accessing exchange subsidies for themselves and their families than under a single affordability
rule. If employees pay 50 percent of the premiums in the future, this number increases to 6 million.
Increased use of exchange subsidies would be accompanied by reductions in ESI coverage and increased
costs to taxpayers. Alternatively, choosing a single affordability rule would initially result in close
to 4 million dependents of workers with affordable single coverage not having affordable health insurance.
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The Affordable Care Act (ACA)
1 represents a major change in the provision and 
organization of health insurance in the United States, using four primary strategies: an expansion 
in Medicaid to low-income adults, a series of sliding scale subsidies for other low to middle 
income families, fines for certain employers and individuals who do not offer or obtain coverage, 
and a restructuring of and reforms to the individual health insurance market to create health 
insurance “exchanges”. Under the ACA, low- to middle- income families are eligible for 
subsidized exchange health insurance only if employer coverage is not offered or is offered but 
not considered affordable, thus forming a “firewall” (CBO, 2010) that prevents unintended 
movement out of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI)  towards subsidized exchange 
coverage.  For ESI to be considered “affordable” under the ACA, the employee portion of the 
premium must not exceed 9.5 percent of household income.  If employers do not offer coverage 
or offer unaffordable coverage and employees receive subsidized coverage through the exchange, 
large employers with more than 50 full-time equivalent workers are subject to fines. The 
unresolved question we investigate in this paper is whether the firewall condition refers to the 
cost of single coverage alone (henceforth referred to as the “single” definition), or to family or 
single coverage as applicable to the worker (henceforth referred to as the “family” definition).  
The ACA is expected to substantially expand health insurance coverage to uninsured 
Americans. However, there are also various aspects of the law that could have unintended effects 
on employer and employee behavior.
  One concern that has been raised is that firms may drop 
                                                 
1 The full text of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (P.L.111-148) can be found at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h3590enr.txt.pdf and the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 can be found at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h4872enr.txt.pdf 
More detailed reviews of the ACA provisions for employers can be found elsewhere, including Simon (2010). 3 
 
coverage so that their workers can take advantage of the public subsidies for health insurance 
provided through the exchanges (Adamy, 2011). If the firm’s employees are drawn from both 
lower and higher income households, however, dropping coverage might benefit lower income 
workers, but would likely make higher income workers worse off because those over 400 percent 
of the federal poverty line are not eligible for exchange subsidies under the ACA. Therefore, 
they would lose the tax advantages of ESI coverage and potentially face more costly premiums 
in non-employer purchasing arrangements because of higher administrative costs or adverse 
selection in the exchanges. Since non-discrimination laws prevent firms from offering ESI 
coverage to their higher income workers without also doing so for their lower income workers, 
the incentives to drop coverage are likely to be low for employers with a heterogeneous 
workforce. However, while such employers may not drop coverage, the subsidies could induce 
strategic behavior to change labor contracts in other ways (Kessler, 2011, McKinsey Quarterly, 
2011).  
In this paper, we study the importance of defining affordability by the single or family 
coverage standard for estimates of exchange and ESI coverage, and for lower income workers’ 
ability to find affordable family coverage.  This analysis is especially important since it provides 
information to policymakers as they consider the affordability decision during the law’s 
implementation stage. We use household survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
merged with employer health insurance data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey – 
Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) and exchange premium estimates from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (KFF) Web site to perform calculations of potential gains and losses for workers and 
their firms if affordability is defined by the single or by the family option.  4 
 
Since the exchange vs. ESI decision is most relevant for workers who fall into the income 
range potentially eligible for subsidies and who either have current ESI coverage in the CPS or 
would be affected by the employer mandate under the ACA, we perform our calculations of 
potential incentives for this subsample of workers.
 2 These calculations assume the worker bears 
the full employer’s cost of health insurance through reduced wages, and take into account the tax 
benefits to ESI and the ACA fines that large employers would pay if workers receive subsidies. 
The calculations identify the workers for whom there is “money on the table” (potential financial 
gains to switching into exchange coverage) created by the availability of exchange subsidies. We 
present stylized cases to answer the following question: what fraction of those with “money on 
the table” would be classified as having unaffordable coverage under the single vs. the family 
definition of affordability?  The answer also depends on the way that employers set the employee 
contributions to health insurance. However, the willingness and ability of workers and firms to 
act on these financial incentives depend on several other factors outside our calculations. For 
example, it is uncertain how attractive exchange plans will appear relative to ESI plans. It is also 
uncertain how ESI plans will change in the future as a consequence of rising health care costs. 
As a result, our first goal is to present a stylized range of estimates that illustrate the possible 
importance of the affordability definition on exchange and ESI coverage rates.  
Since the average annual total premium for family coverage is roughly $8,000 higher 
than that for single coverage ($12,298 vs. $4,386 in 2008, shown in Table 1), there is the 
potential for substantially more families to obtain subsidized coverage through the exchanges if 
affordability is based on family coverage, if employee premium contributions are set sufficiently 
                                                 
2 The workers who are potentially eligible for subsidies are those in families with incomes in the range of 133 to 400 
percent of the poverty line. Four times the poverty line is $84,800 for a family of four in 2008. The workers who fall 
under the employer mandate rule are full time workers in firms with more than 50 employees. 5 
 
high.
3 The affordability definition could significantly impact the ability of lower income workers’ 
dependents to find affordably-priced coverage if single ESI coverage is affordable but family 
ESI coverage is not. Thus, as the second component of our analysis, we show the consequence of 
adopting the single affordability definition on the number of low-income workers with families 
that would find themselves in a “no-man’s land” with no source of affordable family coverage. 
When ESI single coverage is affordable, both the worker and dependents would be restricted 
from receiving exchange subsidies, regardless of how unaffordable family ESI coverage might 
be.   
Hence, we estimate that choosing a family affordability rule could initially lead to as 
many as 1.3 million more workers accessing exchange subsidies for themselves and their 
families than under a single affordability rule. If employees pay 50 percent of the premiums in 
the future, this increases to 6 million. Increased use of exchange subsidies would be 
accompanied by reductions in ESI coverage and increased costs to taxpayers. Alternatively, 
choosing a single affordability rule would initially result in close to 4 million dependents of 
workers not having affordable health insurance from any source. This would grow to close to 13 
million if employees pay 50 percent of the premium.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. We first review the reasons why the definition of 
affordability in the ACA is ambiguous.  Second, we present a simple example of why this 
definitional choice for affordability has meaningful consequences for workers and their families 
and how the consequences vary with the level of employee contributions to health insurance 
premiums. Next, we review the prior relevant literature and present our conceptual framework 
and calculations. We then describe our data set construction, methods, and results. We conclude 
                                                 
3 Single individuals between 133 percent and 400 percent of the poverty line who have no dependents or whose 
dependents are all covered by existing public insurance programs (CHIP) are not affected by the affordability 
decision since the applicable definition of affordability for those workers is single coverage. 6 
 
with a discussion of the limitations and implications of our results for future policy simulations 
of the ACA’s consequences for subsidized exchange insurance for lower income families. 
 
2. The Source of Ambiguity Regarding the ACA Definition of Affordability 
While it is clear that the ACA considers an offer of ESI to be affordable if it costs less 
than 9.5 percent of gross household income, it is unclear whether this refers to the premium for 
single coverage or family coverage as applicable to the workers, or whether it always refers to 
single coverage.  The Senate Finance Committee report published on October 18, 2009, upon 
which the eventual ACA legislation was based defined affordability as follows: “Unaffordable is 
defined as coverage with a premium required to be paid by the employee that is ten 
percent or more of the employee’s income, based on the type of coverage applicable (e.g., 
individual or family coverage).” (Underline added, U.S. Senate, 2009, p.39). Between October 
18, 2009 and December 24, 2009 when the final bill was passed by the Senate, the language that 
defines affordability was changed with the word “self-only coverage” substituted for “the type 
of coverage applicable (e.g., individual or family coverage)”.  Because the House of 
Representatives accepted as a whole the language in the Senate bill, in the final version of 
the ACA legislation passed by both Houses and signed by President Obama affordability is 
defined in section 5000A(e)(1)(B) as: 
“(B) REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘required 
contribution’ means—  
(i) in the case of an individual eligible to purchase minimum essential coverage consisting of 
coverage through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the portion of the annual premium which 7 
 
would be paid by the individual (without regard to whether paid through salary reduction or 
otherwise) for self-only coverage” (underline added).  
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
used the definition of single coverage in scoring the bill, following the language in Section 
5000A(e)(1)(B) of the ACA.  Under this interpretation, families will receive premium subsidies 
on the exchanges based on income only if they were not offered ESI coverage at all or if the firm 
offered coverage to them but the “single option”, as opposed to the “family option” was 
unaffordable.
4  
However, language in other parts of the ACA still refers to coverage for families as well.  
For example, Section 1513 describes the shared responsibility clause that triggers a fine as 
occurring when a “… large employer fails to offer to its full-time employees (and their 
dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage…”  The section further 
stipulates that a large employer that has offered its “...full time employees (and their dependents) 
the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage…” but nonetheless has one or more of 
its full time employee enroll in an exchange plan and receive a subsidy will trigger a different 
fine. (Underline added). 
This ambiguity about whether the affordable coverage rule applies to single coverage or 
family coverage for workers with families is scheduled to be resolved through a proposed 
implementation rule announced August 12
th 2011 by the Department of Health and Human 
                                                 
4 Families will also receive premium subsidies if the offered coverage did not meet minimum essential coverage 
guidelines and was less than 60 percent in actuarial value; Section 1512 stipulates this happens “ if the employer 
plan’s share of the total allowed costs of benefits provided under the plan is less than 60 percent of such costs”. 
Since we do not know the actuarial values of current plans, this is not a feature of the law that we study. We also 
ignore a provision regarding “free choice vouchers” that was repealed as part of the 2011 budget act, (§1858 of H.R. 
1473, Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011). 8 
 
Services, with hearings set for November 17
th 2011.
5 The proposed rule is to use the single 
definition of affordability.  
Before we describe our conceptual framework and empirical approach in detail, we 
illustrate the importance of the definition of affordability and the employee contribution level in 
the context of three hypothetical families that each contains one worker and three dependents 
(Table 1). In column 1, we list the annual, before-tax income of these three families that earn 133 
percent, 250 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line respectively. Their income 
values span the full income range for exchange subsidies. Columns 2 and 3 display the total 
average national premiums for single and family coverage. Our ESI prices are based on the 2008 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC). The national average total 
premium for single coverage in 2008 is $4,386 (column 2) and the national average employee 
premium amount is $882, thus the average national employee contribution share for single 
coverage is 20.1 percent. The national average total premium for family coverage is $12,298 
(column 3) and the corresponding employee premium is $3,394, thus the employee share for 
family coverage is 27.5 percent. Column 4 shows the typical amount of subsidy each of these 
families would receive towards exchange coverage, calculated from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (KFF) exchange premium calculator.
6 The amount of money the worker would 
actually gain in cash compensation would be lower than the subsidy by the amount of the 
                                                 
5  45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 155 and 157, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
available at http://www.ofr.gov/(X(1)S(cjrlex1mz20ayk4j1n3szdny))/OFRUpload/OFRData/2011-20776_PI.pdf,, 
accessed August 2011. 
6 Subsidies are calculated by obtaining the predicted exchange premium from the KFF calculator, and then following 
the legislative language that caps out of pocket premium spending according to the relevant level of income as a 
percent of the poverty level. The remainder is the subsidy, a refundable and advanceable premium tax credit 
provided by the government. We do not take additional cost sharing subsidies into account. 9 
 
employer fine; the fact that ESI premiums are tax exempt while any out of pocket payments to 
exchange coverage are not is also later taken into consideration.
 7 
Column 5 of Table 1 shows that if employers keep employee contributions at the current 
national average level of 20.1 percent for single coverage, the average contributions of workers 
for single coverage never exceed 9.5 percent of family income. Hence if the affordability 
definition for access to exchange subsidies is affordable single coverage, and if employee 
contributions do not change, none of our Table 1 families would be eligible for an exchange 
subsidy even if their family ESI coverage was unaffordable. While the worker would have 
affordable single coverage, his or her dependents would be in a “no-man’s land” with 
unaffordable ESI family coverage and no access to exchange subsidies despite meeting the 
income criteria for such coverage.
8  If employers keep employee contributions at the current 
level of 27.5 percent for family coverage, the family ESI contributions of our workers living in 
families with income of 250 and 400 percent of poverty also do not exceed 9.5 percent of their 
income (Column 6 of Table 1). Hence, they and their families would not be eligible for an 
exchange subsidy even using the family affordability rule because their ESI family coverage is 
affordable. But the worker with family income of 133 percent of poverty would now be eligible 
for an exchange subsidy even though the worker’s single coverage was affordable. Hence when 
the family affordability criterion is used, no dependents will ever find themselves in “no-man’s 
land”. But the tradeoff in this example is that the exchange subsidy firewall will be breached by 
                                                 
7 The tax advantage provided to ESI is estimated to result in $1.1 trillion in foregone tax revenue in 2012-2016 
(Fronstin, 2011). 
8 In this simplified exercise, we do not take into account the availability of CHIP coverage for children in some 
families earning above 133 percent of poverty. When using micro data to calculate the number of dependents who 
do not have access to affordable coverage, we take into account the CHIP eligibility rules present in each state in 
2008. 10 
 
the lowest income worker, who would have an incentive to seek exchange subsidized insurance 
for his or her family despite having an offer of affordable single ESI. 
Columns 7 and 8 show how the ability to breach the firewall depends on the employee 
contribution to health insurance. In this extreme case, we assume labor contracts are re-
negotiated so that the worker will pay 100 percent of the ESI premium. In column 7 we see that 
even when a single affordability definition is used, the worker living in a family with income at 
133 percent of the poverty line now pays more than 9.5 percent of that income in ESI premiums.  
Hence that worker and his/her dependents can gain access to exchange subsidies. In column 8 the 
firewall breach is even greater as all our families qualify as having unaffordable ESI coverage 
using the family affordability definition, and gain access to exchange subsidies. Although not 
shown in Table 1, an employer is fined for not offering affordable coverage. However, at $3,000 
or $2,000 a worker, the fine is low relative to the cost of family health insurance.   These simple 
hypothetical examples in Table 1 illustrate how the ability of families to claim unaffordable 
coverage and access exchange subsidies depends on the definition of affordability (single or 
family) as well as the amount the employee contributes to ESI coverage, and motivates the 
analysis we perform with the micro data.  
Prior Literature 
A few existing studies comment on the potential effects of ACA features on health 
insurance outcomes, although none have studied the family vs. single affordability criterion. A 
set of papers have considered how consumers may view exchange coverage.  
Dafny, Ho and Varela (2010) estimate that the value to consumers of choosing among the 
greater number of plan options that are likely to be available in exchanges relative to what is 
typically offered by an employer would be substantial, and between 10 percent and 40 percent of 11 
 
current employer health insurance contributions. Another paper relevant to understanding the 
take-up of exchange coverage is Abraham and Feldman (2010), who simulate the willingness to 
purchase individual market insurance for workers who currently have ESI but might be 
uninsured in the future for various reasons. They find that the majority of these workers would 
be willing to purchase individual exchange coverage. While this paper does not directly compare 
ESI to exchange coverage, it is relevant because it suggests that exchanges would be viable and 
stable markets because of the total number of customers they would draw. 
Although exchanges may draw customers due to the greater product variety they offer, 
low income workers may face difficulty in accessing exchange subsidies because they are 
provided as tax credits based on past income, and because of the discontinuity families face 
between Medicaid and exchange subsidies at 133 percent of the poverty line (Sommers and 
Rosenbaum, 2011). Graves (2011) analyzes different ways in which the method of calculating 
and administering subsidies could be made easier for families. He estimates that errors in 
calculating subsidy amounts under the current proposed system could actually lead to greater 
participation in exchange coverage among lower income families.  
Thus, while our calculations assume that employers and employees will view exchange 
coverage and ESI as equivalent forms of coverage, it is still unclear whether this will be the case. 
Uncertainty remains regarding the degree of competition, and the resulting prices and plan 
characteristics. 
 Aside from issues of exchange coverage, other recent papers study different insurance 
aspects of the ACA. For example, Pizer, Frakt and Iezzoni (2011) look at how the Medicaid 
expansion and the excise tax on high premiums (the “Cadillac tax”) might affect insurance 
outcomes in the very long run. They forecast that the interaction between these two features of 12 
 
the ACA could lead to higher Medicaid participation and lower ESI coverage than otherwise 
predicted.  
In addition to the academic literature relevant for understanding isolated and specific 
aspects of reform, reports from comprehensive models of the ACA exist that are able to make 
predictions based on a sophisticated approach that integrates all the complex aspects of the law. 
The most important of these is the model used by the CBO (CBO, 2007a) that estimates the 
number of Americans likely to be covered by specific provisions of the ACA over a 10-year 
horizon. The health insurance provisions of the ACA are estimated to increase the rate of insured, 
non-elderly Americans to between 92 percent and 94 percent (CBO, 2010) through a 
combination of different approaches. By 2019, CBO expects the number of people covered by 
ESI to be 3 million lower on net, as a result of an increase of ESI of about 6 to 7 million (mostly 
because of the individual mandate); a reduction of 8 to 9 million people with ESI due to firms 
dropping ESI offers; and a reduction of 1 to 2 million people who would drop ESI and obtain 
exchange coverage, both because they would be able to claim their current ESI was unaffordable 
and obtain subsidies for exchange coverage, and because of possible imperfect enforcement of 
the firewall rules. 
Since the CBO’s publication of its estimates of the ACA, Holtz-Eakin and Smith (2010) 
raised a question of whether there may be more employers who drop ESI than is assumed in the 
CBO (2010) model. Holtz-Eakin and Smith (2010) argue that the exchange subsidies in the ACA 
are so substantial that they will encourage employers and employees to change their labor 
contracts to gain access to the “money on the table”. By examining the possibility that employers 
may drop ESI, they abstract from whether affordability is defined by single or family coverage, 
and do not comment on the possibility that employers may change employee contributions as an 13 
 
alternative strategy. Using hypothetical workers, they point to stylized cases where it makes 
financial sense for large employers to drop health insurance coverage and pay the $2,000 fine. 
They calculate that it is in the interest of large firms to only employ full-time workers living in 
families with income up to roughly 200 to 250 percent of the poverty line as that is the income 
range in which exchange subsidies are financially beneficial despite the loss of tax benefits and 
the $2,000 fine that results from no longer offering ESI. The employers could then pay the 
workers higher wages than they were able to when providing ESI.  Holtz-Eakin and Smith note 
that whether firms will actually fully adjust in this manner will depend on certain inflexibilities 
in the labor market, but that “the massive federal subsidies are money on the table inviting a vast 
reworking of compensation packages.” (Holtz-Eakin and Smith, 2010, p. 4.)   
Unlike Holtz-Eakin and Smith, (2010) or the CBO (2010), we assume that no firms drop 
ESI coverage. We make this extreme assumption to highlight an alternative possibility through 
which workers and their employers can gain access to that “money on the table”, by resetting the 
employer-employee sharing of the ESI premium within a firm.
9 In this case we show why low-
wage workers may remain with their current employer  after the ACA and  become subject to 
higher premium sharing rules, rather than sort to exclusively low-income firms.  
In July 2007, Massachusetts became the first state to implement a package of reforms that 
bears resemblance to the ACA. The fine for employers who do not provide insurance that is 
“fair and reasonable” (at most, 67 percent of the premium is contributed by the employee) is 
nominal. However, employers and employees may face less “money on the table” to reduce 
generosity of ESI than under the ACA because Massachusetts requires employers to pay a large 
                                                 
9 In tables available upon request, we compare how our results would change if we assume no employers adjust 
employee premiums but they drop coverage as in the Holtz-Eakin and Smith (2010) case. We find that dropping 
coverage as in Holtz-Eakin and Smith (2010) results in larger reductions in ESI coverage than in any of our cases, 
although the difference between their case and our family affordability case with high employee premium 
contributions is relatively small. 14 
 
share of their workers’ uncompensated care through the Health Safety Net (HSN) 
(Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2011). Papers analyzing the Massachusetts experience find 
no evidence in the general population that ESI has reduced in response to the law (Long and 
Masi, 2008, and Gruber, 2011) although there is some evidence that private coverage may have 
reduced among the hospitalized population (Kolstad and Kowalski 2010).  
While early evidence from Massachusetts suggests that the ACA may not have a major 
impact on employer provided health insurance, a large literature on how public health insurance 
expansions have affected employer provided insurance coverage of children based on prior 
Medicaid or CHIP expansions suggests that some degree of substitution of coverage is possible. 
A review of the literature in CBO (2007b) concluded that “for every 100 children who gain 
coverage as a result of SCHIP, there is a corresponding reduction in private coverage of 
between 25 and 50 children.” (p.11-12) Thus it has been difficult for these earlier forms of 
public insurance expansions to target the uninsured exclusively, even though many states have 
included measures in their programs to discourage those with an available offer of ESI from 
joining CHIP (Gruber and Simon, 2008). 
 
Conceptual Framework  
In our calculations we focus on behavioral changes that occur among workers living in 
families potentially eligible for exchange subsidies. Workers in families earning between 133 to 
400 percent of the poverty line are assumed to weigh their options between ESI and exchange 
coverage if they are either currently ESI policy holders in the CPS or if they are uninsured but 
would be affected by the employer mandate because they are full-time workers in large firms.
10 
                                                 
10 We assume that any uninsured workers in the CPS must incur a full wage reduction in order to receive ESI under 
the employer mandate. In reality, some of these uninsured workers were offered ESI although it is not recorded in 15 
 
We also consider being uninsured as an option.
11 We assume workers consider costs and benefits 
in a stylized manner where they will find exchange coverage financially preferable if the net cost 
of obtaining that coverage is lower than the net benefits of foregoing their ESI offer, incurring 
the “employer mandate” penalty and losing the tax benefit given to ESI. This is captured by the 
expression:  
[1]      [(Px - Sx)] < [(Pf +Pe - Fe) (1-t)]  
Where the left hand side of the equation represents the cost of obtaining exchange coverage and 
the right hand side represents the benefits to foregoing ESI. Px is the total price charged in the 
exchange, Sx is the subsidy,
12 t is the marginal tax rate, and Pe is the employee contribution to the 
ESI premium and Pf is the firm’s contribution to the ESI premium. Fe is the employer fine 
($3,000). The right hand side of the equation represents “the money on the table” that the 
employee or employer stands to save if he or she were to no longer receive ESI, assuming that 
the full employer saving is passed on through higher wages (as in, for example, Abraham and 
Feldman 2010). We also consider a case where this does not happen.
13 The employer fine is 
                                                                                                                                                             
the CPS. These workers would find it cheaper than we assume to be covered by ESI. But by the logic of full ESI 
pass through to wages, they would have as much to gain from exchange coverage as our calculations imply. Thus, 
the assumption of wage pass through is important in forecasting employee behavior in the future.       
11 Although workers above and below this subsidy income range of 133 to 400 of the poverty line are not affected by 
the definition of affordability changing, we include them in our data set for some of our calculations to put the 
changes we examine in context. Individuals above 400 percent of the poverty line are treated in a similar manner as 
individuals between 133 and 400 percent of the poverty line, except that they would not qualify for exchange 
subsidies. Since the interaction of ESI and exchange coverage is the focus of our paper, we abstract from the ACA 
Medicaid expansion entirely by assuming all workers in families earning less than 133 percent of poverty are 
covered by Medicaid. We do this for convenience, and altering this assumption has no consequence for our main 
analysis. 
12 We take into account the fact that that if the worker were to drop ESI and receive a compensating wage 
differential, the subsidy would be recalculated in equilibrium, as family income would rise. This is a simplification 
as subsidies are first determined by past income, and corrected retrospectively for changes in current income. If 
workers are risk averse, they may undervalue subsidies because of the risk that they may have to pay them back if 
their income is higher than expected. Graves (2011) concludes that these errors in forecasting may increase the 
number of those who enroll in exchange coverage.  
13 If we assume that the employer controls the savings and only passes on to the worker the amount needed to induce 
the employee to obtain the exchange subsidy instead of ESI, we obtain the same results for coverage estimates. The 
only difference is that in this case, the firm receives the economic rents, and that the tax rate on corporate profits 
would be different than the tax rate on employee wages. A different case that we did not explore is one where 16 
 
triggered when a worker from a large firm elects subsidized exchange coverage, which is 
ultimately paid by the employee in the form of reduced cash wages. We initially consider the 
case where the employer mandate penalty and the loss of tax preference for ESI are the only 
costs to declining ESI and assume no affordability firewall exists. In this situation the gap 
between the right hand side and the left hand side of [1] being greater than zero [[(Pf +Pe - Fe) (1-
t)] -[(Px - Sx)] >0]
 represents a financial incentive to obtain subsidized exchange coverage rather 
than seek ESI.
 14 A negative number indicates that even though the worker would be potentially 
eligible for a subsidy, its magnitude is not enough to compensate for the loss of the financial 
benefits of ESI, and the fine if they work in a large firm.   
Next, we add the firewall provision of the ACA into our analysis and consider the effect 
of increases in employee contribution levels on the extent to which workers are able to become 
eligible for subsidized coverage in an exchange. This firewall condition explicitly depends on Pe, 
the amount of the employee premium contribution, as a share of the total family income—it 
cannot exceed 9.5 percent. We view the decision to increase employee contribution levels (Pe) 
while decreasing Pf and increasing wages at the firm as a joint decision between workers and 
employers. As illustrated in Table 1, the effect of increasing Pe on the workers ability to pass the 
affordability firewall is especially large if the affordability definition uses family coverage.  
                                                                                                                                                             
employers can only pass on a fixed proportion, say, 50% of the compensating wage differential. The literature finds 
that employer pass-through of premiums is likely to happen at a larger group level such as the firm, in the relatively 
short run, rather than the individual. It is unclear how the incidence may be in a longer time horizon such as ones 
typically used for ACA consideration. Nevertheless, the speed with which compensation packages adjust introduce 
transaction costs and dampened incentives to consider exchange coverage, which could lead to fewer workers 
choosing exchange coverage if full adjustment did not occur. 
14 Since workers for whom ESI and exchange coverage are relevant choices also have the option of being uninsured, 
we perform a calculation to check if those who were uninsured to begin with would find being uninsured financially 
better even after reform. To do that, we calculate if the worker decides to be uninsured by: 
[2] {Cost of better outcome in [Equation 1] }> {(Fi + d) (Income)}  
where Fi is the individual-level mandated fine, and d is 10 percent if the person is less than aged 35 and 20 percent if 
aged 35 or older. Income is family income. We find very few would prefer to be uninsured. This is consistent with 
findings in the literature, e.g. Abraham and Feldman (2011), showing high valuation for insurance by those who 
would otherwise be uninsured in the future. When we used alternate values of 5, 10, and 15 percent for d for 
everyone, our results did not change in any meaningful way. 17 
 
In the short run, employer attempts to increase the employee cost sharing across the 
board so that lower-income workers can qualify for subsidies would be viewed unfavorably by 
higher income workers, unless the employer were able to convince workers that the 
corresponding wage increases simply offset the increased employee cost sharing. In the longer 
run, inflation, new job creation and old job destruction aid the process of adjusting employee 
contributions. Because Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules allow both employers and 
employees to contribute to health insurance premiums on a pre-tax basis (as long as employers 
establish the necessary paperwork) the split between employee and employer contributions for 
health insurance can be viewed as largely artificial in the long run as long as wages are adjusted.
 
15, 16 
After calculating the financial incentive represented by the existence of subsidies under 
the ACA for families between 133 and 400 percent of poverty, [(Pf +Pe - Fe) (1-t)] -[(Px - Sx)], we 
first graph its distribution. This helps us understand how much “money on the table” exists that 
may incent employees and employers to re-negotiate their compensation packages in the long 
run. Next, we focus just on those workers who find themselves facing potential gains if they 
were to choose exchange coverage.  We calculate what fraction of these workers can overcome 
                                                 
15 The ability of small firms to provide health insurance usually depends on the fraction of eligible employees 
accepting coverage. Small employers tend to have low employee contributions to ensure high participation rates, an 
issue that does not concern large employers. Insurer practices in unregulated markets allow them to put restrictions 
on terms of sale such as this. When reforms are instituted in the insurance market, this may not matter. For example, 
small firm exchanges will offer guaranteed issue plans with modified community rated premiums that allow for 
limited age variation and tobacco use. These premiums will not depend on the participation rate. Thus, at the 
extreme, all employers could set the annual contribution just above 9.5 percent of the income of the highest family 
income worker to qualify for a subsidy ($88,900, thus setting the family contribution at $8,454) and bypass the 
affordability rule.  
Very few workers of firms with more than 50 workers are in situations where they do not have a premium 
conversion arrangement, by unpublished estimates provided by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality. 
16 Consider the following simple example. Suppose that in the long run employers require $10,000 as a contribution 
towards health insurance from employees and contribute $2,000 as the employer contribution. Workers at the firm 
should be indifferent (i.e. they have the same take home pay and the same fringe benefit package) if the employer 
had instead decided to ask for $11,000 as an employee contribution, but paid all workers at the firm $1,000 extra. 
Since the change in employee contribution and the change in wage is across the board at the firm, it does not involve 
any assumptions about whether wage-fringe tradeoffs occur at the worker or firm level.   18 
 
the affordability firewall and obtain exchange coverage depending on different levels of 
employee contributions and, depending on whether we use a single or family definition of 
affordability. We also examine how these patterns differ by specific income ranges, and by 
whether the workers are in small or large firms.  
As the second component of our analysis, we calculate how many low-income workers 
would find themselves with no source of affordable coverage for their families if a single 
coverage definition of affordability is adopted under the ACA.  The number of such families in 
“no-man’s land” would depend on the premium contribution rule used by the employer.  To 
perform this calculation, we focus on those workers who find themselves facing potential gains if 
they were to choose exchange coverage, and who have dependents to insure. We then examine 
how many of these workers would find their ESI family coverage unaffordable, but their ESI 
single coverage affordable, and thus be unable to obtain subsidies in the exchange under the 
single affordability definition. We examine how the number of workers and dependents in this 
“no-man’s land” changes with increases in the employee contribution rule. 
 
Data Sources and Compilation of Dataset  
We conduct calculations to illustrate the importance of the definition of affordability 
using a nationally representative sample of the population from the 2009 March Current 
Population Survey (which contains data from 2008), merged with additional data from other CPS 
data sets and information on average health insurance premiums from the MEPS-IC and KFF. 
We limit our sample to private sector non-self-employed working age individuals (aged 17 to 64). 
When we consider the decisions of these workers, we take into consideration the relevant 
characteristics of their family (such as the number of dependents) and create family health 19 
 
insurance units, grouping parents and children under the age of 26 living in the same family 
together. We assign individuals to one insurance status rather than allowing them to hold 
multiple insurance types using a hierarchy explained in the data appendix. We merge data on 
health insurance costs (total premiums, as well as the employee and employer portions) from 
2008 MEPS-IC public-use summary tables using state and firm size (above and below 50 
workers),
17 separately by single and other types of family plans.
18,19 Our sample size of workers 
in the 2009 March CPS is 36,950, representing 95,496,817 workers. The estimate from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for the number of total workers in the United States is 139,817,000 in 
July 2009.
20 As expected, this is higher than our total since we limit the sample to be 17-64 year 
old private-sector non self-employed workers.  
We obtain estimates of exchange premiums from the KFF exchange premium 
calculator.
21 These estimates pertain to the Silver Plan, and are obtained by age group of the 
                                                 
17 The March CPS asks individuals to report the size of their employer, and offers options of less than 10, 10-24, 25-
99, 100-499, 500-999 and 1,000 and over. For purpose of the law, an important cutoff point occurs with respect to 
firms with 50 workers, meaning that workers in the 25-99 category must be assigned to either the 25-50 or 51-99 
firm size category. The MEPS-IC data show that of all firms with 25-99 workers, about half the workers are 
employed by firms in the 25-50 firm size category. Thus, we randomly assign half of the workers in the CPS 25-99 
firm size category to the 25-50 firm size category and the rest to the 50-99 firm size category. 
18 In calculating ESI premiums, we create customized family plans rather than assume that employers would price 
all family sizes the same. We do this by obtaining the details for single coverage and the details for “employee plus 
one” coverage. We assume that the difference represents the marginal cost of an additional dependent. We then add 
multiples of this extra cost to a policy so that we obtain different family coverage types for families or 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. 
We have also conducted some sensitivity tests where we use a full family policy (as reported in the MEPS-IC data) 
regardless of how many dependents are present. 
19 We merge in average values as specific employer health insurance costs are not collected in the CPS. Current 
evidence shows that ESI generosity for low-wage workers depend substantially on the characteristics of their co-
workers (Vistnes and Monheit, 2011), thus there is variation even within state and firm size that we cannot bring in 
to our models, although it is not clear if this causes any bias. One possibility is that the employee premium shares 
could be higher than average in firms where low income workers are found, which would lead to more workers 
finding coverage unaffordable than we predict.  
20 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.a.htm, accessed August 2010. 
21 http://healthreform.k_.org/SubsidyCalculator.aspx, accessed March 29th 2010. There is a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding future exchange premiums, such as whether they may be higher than anticipated because of 
possible adverse selection into exchange coverage. Thus, we kept the KFF premiums in 2014 terms for lack of a CPI 
for adjustment to 2008 terms and to counteract some of this possible understatement of exchange premiums.  The 
KFF estimates are for a 70 percent actuarial value plan, which is less generous on average than ESI plans. Gabel et 
al, (2006) show that actuarial values of ESI plans range from 73.4% to 87.6% depending on the state. To the extent 
that exchange plans are lower in actuarial value than ESI plans, there will be less of an incentive to move towards 20 
 
policy holder, for a “medium” cost region.  To calculate the cost of family coverage we obtained 
the difference between the cost of single coverage and coverage for a family of four and divided 
that difference by three. We used this resulting number as the cost of an additional family 
member in the exchange. 
An issue we consider in detail in constructing the data set and in later calculations is how 
the law treats different types of families in the CPS. Even though we focus only on workers for 
our tables, the incentives for health insurance choices made by these workers are influenced by 
their family circumstances. For example, families with one worker will face different options 
under reform than families with two workers. It further matters whether each of the workers has 
existing ESI coverage, whether that ESI is single or family coverage, whether the workers are 
employed in large or small firms, in full-time or part-time jobs, and whether the children are 
already enrolled in Medicaid or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Medicaid and 
CHIP (henceforth referred to as CHIP for children’s coverage) are potentially very important 
because the existing eligibility thresholds for children’s public coverage are generally much 
higher than the adults’ threshold even after the Medicaid expansion under the ACA. This has 
implications for whether a lower income family who considers exchange coverage may find their 
children to be eligible for CHIP.
22  
                                                                                                                                                             
exchange coverage. However, Dafny et al (2010) show that consumers value the increased choice they face in 
exchange coverage to a substantial degree, which may counteract the lower actuarial value for the Silver Plans. The 
ACA also has provisions to ensure that the actuarial value of exchange plans increases for low income families, to 
94% for families up to 150% FPL, until it reaches 70% at 400% FPL through cost sharing subsidies, thus it is 
unclear whether the lower actuarial value of exchange plans would affect our results.  
22Any children who are found eligible for CHIP but not signed up are likely to be provided with CHIP and the 
remainder of the family would receive exchange coverage. If there are children who are already on public health 
insurance in the CPS, we assume that they will keep that coverage throughout our calculations. We assume currently 
fully uninsured or currently fully ESI insured families stay together for health insurance choices and that children 
not already enrolled in public coverage will not be put into a separate plan. However, we have conducted separate 
calculations assuming all eligible children will take-up CHIP and we report later in the paper (in Table 4 and 
footnotes) the sensitivity of results to this extreme assumption. How CHIP eligible children who are not currently 
enrolled are treated in our calculations could have potential biases in both directions for our final results regarding 
ESI vs. exchange coverage. Separating the children into one plan could make exchange coverage less desirable 21 
 
The structure of the family also matters when calculating employer fines for obtaining 
exchange coverage. We assume that if a family with two workers obtains a family plan with a 
subsidy in the exchange, only the main policy holder would trigger a fine for their employer. 
That is, a secondary worker in the same family who is a dependent under the exchange insurance 
policy will not trigger their own employer fine since the subsidy is technically received only by 
the main policy-holder worker in our calculations. If the fine is interpreted to apply to both 
workers, then this means smaller perceived financial advantages to exchange coverage. However, 
this provision applies only to families with two full time workers in large firms, and it is likely 
that the total incomes of these families may make it less likely that they would benefit 
substantially from exchange subsidies in the first place. We explain in detail these and other 
assumptions we make about the treatment of family members in Data Set Methods appendix 
accompanying this paper (http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w17279). However, there are 
many possible alternative treatments of families that we have not considered here and ones 




                                                                                                                                                             
relative to continuing ESI. On the other hand, it could make exchange coverage more desirable for the worker 
because the children could now have lower out of pocket costs in CHIP than exchange coverage. The effect of this 
decision on the number of dependents in “no-man’s land” in Table 4 is clearer, as being eligible for CHIP will 
reduce the number of dependents without access to affordable coverage. 
23 To illustrate the complexity of these issues (which are yet to be decided by regulation), consider a specific 
example. A single low- income mother initially obtains ESI coverage for the family, but her employer increases the 
employee contribution under the family definition of the firewall that would enable her to be eligible for exchange 
subsidies for her family. Upon application for exchange coverage, her children are found to be eligible for CHIP, 
which means that she would essentially be obtaining single coverage in the exchange for herself. She may now no 
longer qualify for a subsidy for exchange coverage since the applicable definition for obtaining exchange subsidies 
may now be single coverage affordability for her.  If this turns out to be the rule, Equation 1 would suggest that this 
mother would prefer exchange coverage. But she would actually prefer ESI. To see how sensitive our results are to 
this possibility we have conducted alternative calculations assuming all children eligible but not signed up for CHIP 
fully take-up CHIP. Doing so, we find relatively small changes in the distribution of incentives. For example, the 




Financial Incentives Calculations 
Using data on workers from the 2009 March CPS and Equation 1, we calculate the extent 
to which workers gain or lose financially from switching to subsidized exchange coverage, if 
they are able to overcome the affordability firewall. We perform these calculations only for 
workers who are income eligible for exchange subsidies (133 percent to 400 percent of poverty) 
and are either currently covered by ESI or would be affected by the ACA employer mandate. We 
take the applicable fines and taxes into account and graph a kernel density plot of the full range 
of possible annual financial incentives ([(Pf +Pe - Fe) (1-t)] -(Px - Sx))
 24  in Figure 1. There are 
23,913,307 workers represented in Figure 1’s universe. The X axis shows the dollar amounts 
calculated from Equation 1, and the Y axis shows the fraction of the sample corresponding to 
those dollar values.  Summing the area under the graph between certain values allows us to 
compute the fraction of the sample that stands to gain (or lose) that amount annually by choosing 
exchange coverage instead of ESI.   
Even though all the 23,913,307 workers represented in Figure 1 are eligible for a subsidy 
based on their income and employment status, ESI coverage is a better financial option for 60 
percent of them. This is an indication of the effectiveness of the individual fines and tax penalties 
in the ACA in reducing the potential crowd out of ESI.   The remaining 40 percent of these 
workers face a financial incentive to obtain exchange coverage. A substantial fraction of this 
                                                 
24 In our calculations, we do not consider the possibility that workers would move from large firms to small firms to 
avoid the penalty of $3,000 each. If this behavior were to occur in the long run, workers would have more financial 
incentives to move out of ESI than our calculations suggest. We also ignore subsidies available to small firms to 
offer coverage because of their temporary nature  of up to two years and because the full credit of 50 percent of the 
employer contribution towards coverage (which could be as low as 50 percent of the total, putting the credit as low 
as 25 percent of the cost of coverage) is available only to very small firms with very low-wage workers (firm size 
less than 10 workers, average annual wages less than $25,000), many of whom may be eligible for Medicaid or 
highly subsidized exchange coverage. The cutoff for Medicaid, 133 percent of the federal poverty level, is currently 
somewhat less than $30,000 a year for adults in a family of four. 23 
 
population has large positive incentives to forego ESI and obtain a subsidy to purchase exchange 
coverage; 24.82 percent of the sample stands to gain at least $2,000 a year and 11.88 percent 
stands to gain at least $5,000 a year.   
ESI and Exchange Coverage under Different Employee Contribution Levels For 
Single and Family Definitions 
We next consider the extent to which workers with financial incentives to obtain 
exchange coverage would be able to overcome the affordability firewall under the single and 
family definitions. Figure 2 shows ESI coverage rates in the first of the two graphs, and 
exchange coverage rates in the second of the two graphs, in the context of all workers in our full 
sample. The solid line depicts the single definition and the dotted line depicts the family 
definition, for the full range of possible employee contributions. Although the data presented are 
for all workers, variation in results from one affordability definition to another and from one 
employee contribution level to another stem from the workers in families with incomes between 
133 and 400 percent of poverty. Table 2 presents the data behind Figure 2 for three different 
levels of employee contribution shares: the current level, 50 percent and 100 percent of the 
premium.
25  
Figure 2 shows a flat line indicating that exchange and ESI rates do not vary with 
employee premium contribution shares, in either the single or the family affordability definitions, 
until employee contribution shares reach approximately 20 percent. This is because average 
employee premium contributions for both single and family coverage are low enough that no 
worker with family income between 133 and 400 percent of poverty breaches the affordability 
firewall until employee premiums reach approximately 20 percent of total premium costs. Figure 
                                                 
25 The current employee contribution as a percent of the total ESI premium varies in our micro data, thus we only 
indicate the national average on the graph. 24 
 
2 and the accompanying Table 2 show a large amount of movement into exchange coverage and 
out of ESI under the family definition, as employee contributions rise from current levels (on 
average 20.1 percent for single coverage and 27.5 percent for family coverage), until they reach 
the 50 - 60 percent of premiums range.  As shown in Table 2, ESI coverage rates decline from 
72.94 percent (at current levels) to 65.14 percent (at 50 percent employee contributions) and 
62.57 percent (at 100 percent employee contributions) under the definition of family 
affordability.  The corresponding increase in exchange coverage rates are 13.02, 20.82 and 23.33 
percent, respectively.   In contrast, there are only small changes in ESI coverage under the single 
definition as employee contributions rise from current levels to 50 percent, moving from 74.57 
percent to 73.19 percent, respectively. ESI coverage rates decline from 73.19 to 69.97 percent 
when employee contributions move from 50 percent to 100 percent. This difference in patterns 
for family vs. single coverage is unsurprising. Even at high levels of cost sharing (such as 
employees paying half the cost—$2,193—of the average national single premiums of $4,386), 
single premiums are affordable for most workers, since those with income lower than 133 
percent of poverty are eligible for Medicaid rather than exchange subsidies.
26 But even at lower 
levels of cost sharing than 50 percent, family premiums are high enough that ESI employee 
contributions become unaffordable for many workers.  
While one might have expected successively more workers to have both the incentive and 
the ability to opt for exchange coverage rather than ESI coverage as employee contributions rise 
under the family affordability definition, the line in Figure 1 flattens out after about the 60 
percent employee contribution mark. This is because the marginal family whose coverage is 
made unaffordable by a further increase in the employee contribution beyond this point has 
                                                 
26 For $2,193 to be 9.5 percent of income, the worker’s family income would have to be $23,083, which places a 
family of four at less than the Medicaid threshold income of 133 percent of poverty. 25 
 
relatively higher income. At higher levels of income, exchange subsidies taper off, and the cost 
of the foregone tax benefit and employer penalties make exchange coverage less attractive even 
if the affordability criterion has been met. At about 60 percent of the average cost of a family 
plan, the employee contribution would be roughly $7,400, using values from Table 1. The family 
whose premium would exceed 9.5 percent of income would earn roughly $78,000.  This places 
the family at roughly 370 percent of the poverty line. Thus, the amount of the sliding scale 
subsidy they would receive is very small relative to the fine of $3,000 and the loss of tax benefits 
for ESI, and ESI is a more attractive option.  
Examining the data behind Figure 2 further by firm size and income, Table 2 shows that 
the fraction of workers who would qualify for exchange coverage is much larger in small firms 
(fewer than 50 employees) than in large firms. This is expected since small firms do not face any 
employer penalties and since small firm workers are more likely to live in lower income families. 
Table 2 also shows that changes in the single premium have little effect on ESI rates for those in 
families with income in the range of 301 to 400 percent of poverty. But it makes a much bigger 
difference for lower income families. For workers in families with incomes between 133 and 200 
percent of poverty, ESI falls from 61.44 percent (current levels of employee contributions) to 
49.08 percent (50 percent), while exchange coverage rises from 28.71 to 41.07 percent. In 
contrast, changes in the family premium matter across all income groups but continue to matter 
most for lower income workers. Table 2 shows that changes in the employee contribution to the 
single premium have little effect on ESI rates or exchange coverage for those workers with 
incomes in the range 301 to 400 percent of poverty, but make a much bigger difference for 
workers in lower income families. Exchange coverage rises from 23.67 percent to 32.19 percent 
for those in the 301 to 400 percent of poverty income range when going from 50 percent to 100 26 
 
percent of premiums under the family definition. The corresponding change for those in the 133 
to 200 percent of poverty income group is 62.27 percent to 65.70 percent.   
While our Figures and Tables thus far have shown fractions of our population of workers, 
Table 3 shows the relevant weighted numbers of workers with exchange coverage corresponding 
to Figure 2 and Table 2. When employee premiums remain at their current level, the number of 
workers who would receive exchange subsidies is 5.8 million under a single affordability rule 
and 7.1 million under a family affordability rule. When employees pay 50 percent of premiums, 
the number rises to 7.1 million, and 13.1 million respectively.  At 100 percent premium 
contributions, the numbers rise to 9.9 million and 14.8 million. Even with a 50 percent employee 
contribution, there is a difference of roughly 6 million in the number of workers who could 
receive subsidized exchange coverage if the affordability definition is family rather than single. 
Ability of Worker’ Dependents to Find Affordable Coverage if Single Affordability 
is Adopted 
In Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 2 and 3, we have shown the consequences of selecting the 
single versus the family definition for workers’ ESI and exchange coverage rates. Next, we 
consider the consequences of adopting the single coverage affordability definition, as currently 
proposed for implementation, for dependents’ ability to access affordable coverage. In these 
calculations, we focus solely on the subset of workers who have dependents in need of insurance 
and examine the number that may be caught in a “no-man’s land” with no source of affordable 
coverage for them. This would happen if the worker is offered affordable single ESI coverage, 
but unaffordable family ESI coverage.  In this case dependents are restricted from accessing 
subsidies in the exchange, even though they are eligible based on their family income. Thus they 
face the option of taking unaffordable family ESI or an expensive unsubsidized premium in the 27 
 
exchange.
27 In contrast, if these workers’ contributions for single coverage rise to a level that 
exceeds the firewall, they and their families could obtain subsidies through the exchange.   
Figure 3 shows the relationship between levels of the workers’ contribution for ESI 
coverage under the single coverage rule and number of workers who find themselves in “no-
man’s land” with no source of affordable coverage for dependents.  The sample in Figure 3 is 
restricted to workers (with dependents) who have positive financial incentives to access 
subsidized exchange coverage and are seeking family coverage. Figure 3 is the consequence of 
two offsetting changes that occur as the employee contribution rate rises. As employee 
contributions for single and family coverage rise, dependent coverage becomes increasingly 
unaffordable for workers seeking to insure their families, thus increasing the likelihood of the 
workers dependents being trapped in no-man’s land. But at the same time the worker’s 
likelihood of having unaffordable single coverage rises, allowing both the worker and his or her 
family access to the exchanges and an escape from “no-man’s land”.
28   
Table 4 presents estimates of the number of workers and dependents who would not be 
able to find affordable family coverage at current employee contribution shares and at 50 percent 
and 100 percent of employee premiums if the single definition is used. The Table shows the 
number of workers with unaffordable family coverage, and the number of workers with 
unaffordable single coverage.
 The difference between the two is the number of workers in “no-
man’s land”. We also show in the Table the number of dependents corresponding to the number 
of workers in no-man’s land. Appendix Figure 1 shows the two separate changes graphically, 
                                                 
27 Under the Code of Federal Regulations proposal on which hearings are being held in November 2011, these 
dependents would now be exempt from the individual mandate fine if they were to be uninsured. 
28 In this figure, we restrict the employee contribution to single and family coverage to be set the same, and examine 
consequences when they are both high vs. when they are both high. A different thought experiment would be to keep 
contribution levels for family coverage to be the same and increase only single contribution rates. While the 
incentives created by the single affordability definition is for workers and employees to increase the employee 
contributions to single coverage, we illustrate what would happen under raised family contributions as well because 
future rising health care costs may lead independently to a rise in employee contribution levels. 28 
 
with a dotted line for the number of workers with unaffordable single coverage and a solid line 
for the number of workers with unaffordable family coverage. As employee contributions rise, 
family coverage begins to become unaffordable for many families. However, single coverage 
does not become unaffordable until employee contributions exceed 30 percent. Eventually, as the 
employee contribution rises, more workers and their families escape “no-man’s land” than enter 
it, and the total number of workers who find themselves in no-man’s land falls because they 
become eligible for subsidies. 
Figure 3, Panel A of Table 4, and Appendix Figure 1 show that under single affordability, 
as many as 2.6 million workers with 7.5 million dependents could find themselves without 
affordable ESI or exchange health insurance for those dependents even if employee premiums 
stayed at current levels. Panel A of Table 4 also shows that the number of dependents without 
affordable ESI or exchange insurance could rise to 16 million if rising health care costs lead 
employees to pay half of total premiums in the future. But these numbers do not take into 
account the many currently uninsured children eligible but not signed up for CHIP. Uninsured 
but CHIP-eligible children have a source of affordable coverage, even though they either do not 
know of their eligibility, have attempted to enroll but found the process too difficult, or chose not 
to enroll. Accounting for the availability of CHIP decreases the number of dependents who 
would be without affordable coverage. If these children do enroll in CHIP, the applicable 
insurance type for the workers would be single coverage, or coverage for self and spouse. Thus, 
we produce an alternative set of calculations in Panel B of Table 4 where we assume that all of 
these uninsured but eligible children will be placed into CHIP, using the 2008 CHIP eligibility 
rules in each state.  29 
 
Comparing the results in Table 4 Panel B to Table 4 Panel A, we see that when workers 
would need to seek ESI coverage for fewer dependents in Panel B, family ESI will appear 
unaffordable for fewer workers since the applicable ESI family size will be smaller. In Panel B, 
the consequence of the single affordability definition will be 1.4 million workers with 4 million 
dependents who would be without affordable coverage for dependents, even if employee 
premiums remain at the current level. Panel B further shows that this would be 3.7 million 
workers with 9.9 million dependents if employee contributions are 100% of the premium, and 
5.8 million workers with 12.7 million dependents if employee contributions are 50% of 
employee premiums.  
 
Discussion and Summary 
In this paper we show the importance of two understudied aspects of the ACA: whether 
the affordability definition refers to single or family coverage and the ability of employers and 
employees to alter the share of the ESI premium paid by the worker.  We illustrate with stylized 
calculations based on the March 2009 CPS how important this definition could be, depending on 
what one assumes about how employers and employees set the premium contributions. We first 
calculate the financial incentives that are relevant for every worker in our sample who may 
potentially consider the choice between ESI and exchange coverage.  These incentives are 
created by the existence of public subsidies for exchange coverage, and take into account the 
fines and tax penalties. However, the degree to which workers can act on these potential 
incentives depend on whether the definition of affordability is family or single coverage, and the 
level at which employee cost sharing would be set in the future. The higher the level of cost 30 
 
sharing, the greater the fraction of these workers whose ESI coverage would be considered 
unaffordable.  
Our stylized calculations illustrate the sensitivity of subsidized exchange coverage and 
ESI take-up to these two understudied factors that are important for understanding the potential 
impact of the ACA. We show that under a family definition, relatively small changes in the 
middle of the cost sharing levels (such as 50 percent of the full premium) could have large 
consequences for exchange coverage and ESI rates. We also show there is a difficult tradeoff 
involved, as setting affordability on the single coverage definition would leave many dependents 
without any affordable source of coverage. In fact, if single coverage affordability is adopted, 
close to 6 million workers (and close to 13 million dependents) will be unable to find affordable 
family coverage even if employee contributions are set in the future to be only half of the total 
premium.  
  
Limitations, Caveats and Directions for Future Work 
Given the large degree of uncertainty regarding how health care and health insurance 
markets will evolve in the future, all forecasts of the consequences of the implementation of the 
ACA will be imprecise. Throughout the paper, we mention relevant assumptions and discuss 
possible biases that may result if our assumptions are wrong. Some of our assumptions may lead 
to fewer workers preferring exchange coverage over ESI. For example, if firms and workers are 
not able to control the passthrough of health insurance costs to wages, this may reduce workers 
incentives to opt for exchange coverage. Employers may be reluctant to increase employee 
contributions if the workers who leave ESI to obtain exchange coverage are healthier and lead to 
increased costs for the remaining workers. In the short run, changes of the types discussed here 31 
 
are much less likely to occur than in the long run over many years of adjustment. If exchange 
coverage is less attractive than ESI coverage, this will also tend to make fewer workers prefer 
exchange coverage over ESI.  However, other assumptions we make may bias our results in the 
opposite direction. For example, we assume no firms drop health insurance outright, nor do we 
allow workers to consider moving to small firms, part-time work etc. even in the long run to 
avoid fines and affordability firewalls. These are all questions that remain to be studied as the 
ACA is implemented. 
  Our paper does not provide estimates that are directly comparable to those from CBO or 
other entities, for several reasons. By abstracting from several realistic details that pertain to 
factors not central to our work, we conduct the analysis in a hypothetical manner to illustrate the 
impact of the key factors in the paper—the definition of affordability and the setting of employee 
contributions for ESI. But our analysis does clearly show that estimates that ignore these 
potentially different interpretations of the affordable care rule and the flexibility in premium 
share adjustments they may produce, do not allow consideration of the sensitivity of their ESI 
and subsidized exchange coverage outcomes to a plausible range of possibilities.  
Selecting a definition for the affordability rule involves a difficult tradeoff because while 
single coverage rules do not leave as much room for employers and employees to change 
behavior in ways that would reduce ESI coverage rates, they would leave many millions of 
workers in a “no-man’s land” of finding no source of affordable coverage.  A valuable next step 
for policy analysis research in this regard would be to examine how coverage impacts may be 
affected by these different possible affordability interpretations using more sophisticated 
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Table 1: Illustrating the Importance of Family vs. Single Affordability with Hypothetical Families 
Income  














as % family income 
(5) 
Current  family 
premium share, 

















$4,386  $12,298  $7,793  1.7% 6.4% 8.3% 23.2% 
$84,800 
(400) 
$4,386 $12,298  $4,242  1.04% 4%  5.2%  14.5% 
Notes: These hypothetical families are comprised of four members each. While the ACA language refers to household income in some parts and family income in others, we consistently use only the concept of family income 
(Columns 5 and onwards). 
The first column shows the incomes of these hypothetical families, and the percent of the federal poverty level corresponding to that level of income, in 2008. 
The second column shows the average national single total premium for employer health insurance in 2008 (Source: 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2008/tic1.pdf ) 
The third column shows the average national family total premium for employer health insurance in 2008. (Source: 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2008/tid1.pdf) 
The fourth column shows the gross subsidy that would be available to such a family in the exchange. This number is obtained by taking the Kaiser Family Foundation estimate of the exchange plan premium for a family of 4 
and subtracting out the maximum out of pocket for which this family is eligible. This number does not take taxes or fines into account, and is a gross simplification for illustrative purposes relative to how we perform our 
calculations later in the paper. 
The fifth column shows at the current level of employee contributions for single coverage ($882), what the employee contribution for single coverage would be as a percent of the family’s income 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2008/tic2.pdf  
The sixth column shows at the current level of employee contributions for family coverage ($3,394), what the employee contribution for family coverage would be as a percent of the family’s income. 
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2008/tid2.pdf 
The seventh column shows what the employee contribution for single coverage would be as a percent of the family’s income, if the employee has to contribute 100% of the single premium. 











   Dollars  from  Equation  1 
Notes:  
1. Data for our analysis comes from the March CPS of 2009, merged with estimates of employer health insurance costs in 2008 from the MEPS-IC and estimates of exchange coverage costs from the 
KFF premium calculator. We select workers from the March CPS who are in private sector non self-employed jobs and are aged 17-64 years.  That sample represents 95,392,412 workers, using 
weights. 
2. The sample for Figure1is limited further to workers for whom ESI is a relevant decision (those with own name ESI coverage in the CPS, and those who would be affected by the employer mandate) 
and who live in families with incomes between 133 percent and 400 percent of poverty. This sample represents 23,913,307 workers using weights. 
3. This figure shows a kernel density distribution of financial incentives relevant for considering ESI vs. exchange coverage, after taking taxes and fines into account, but before any affordability 
firewall. The dollars on the x axis correspond to the difference between the two sides of Equation [1]. A positive value indicates annual gains from switching to exchange coverage rather than ESI 
while negative amounts indicate the opposite. The area under the curve from one point to another shows the fraction of the sample with that range of an incentive to move to exchange coverage. ESI 
coverage is a better financial option for 60 percent of the sample (14,224,663/(14,224,663+9,688,644)). The summed area under the positive portion of the graph is 40 percent of the sample, which 
corresponds to 9,688,644 workers in our sample. Of these 9,688,644 workers, 7,904,537workers have dependents who require insurance, while 1,784,107 are either single workers with dependents, or 





1. See Note 1 under Figure 1.  
2. The sample for this Figure consists of all workers in our data set (which represents 95,392,412 workers using weights, by note 1 to Figure 1). 
2. This Figure shows how the percentage of workers with ESI changes with the definition of affordability (single or family) and the employer’s contribution rule (percent of the full ESI premium paid 
by the worker). Points noted here correspond to points described in further detail in Table 2 (100%, 50% and the current average level of employee contributions). Since the current level of employee 
contributions differs by state and firm size, there is no direct equivalent number to indicate in this figure, thus we have drawn in a line corresponding to the average national rate of employee 





1.  See Notes to Figure 2.  
2.  This Table shows the points indicated on Figure 2 corresponding to employee cost sharing of 100%, 50% and the current level of employee contributions.  We show only insurance rates for 







Table 2: Percent of Workers Insured, by Firm Size, and Income Category.  
By Single and Family Affordability Definitions, By Level of Employee Premium Adjustment 
Single Affordability  Family Affordability 
      Current 
Premiums 
50% Premiums  100% Premiums  Current 
Premiums 
50% Premiums  100% Premiums 
      ESI  Exchange ESI  Exchange ESI  Exchange ESI  Exchange ESI  Exchange ESI  Exchange
Percent     74.57  11.39  73.19  12.77  69.97  15.98  72.94  13.02  65.14  20.82  62.57  23.33 
By Firm Size  Small Firm  56.37  24.17  55.56  24.98  52.60  27.95  54.88  25.66  49.51  31.04  45.90  34.64 
   Large Firm  83.73  4.96  82.06  6.62  78.71  9.96  82.04  6.65  73.02  15.68  70.96  17.64 
By Income Ranges  133-200  61.44  28.71  49.08  41.07  33.36  56.78  50.99  39.17  27.89  62.27  24.45  65.70 
of the Federal  201-300  75.75  18.61  74.85  19.51  65.47  28.85  72.35  22.01  48.44  45.94  43.45  50.85 
Poverty Level  301-400  82.84  13.27  82.84  13.27  82.09  14.03  82.68  13.44  72.44  23.67  63.74  32.19 
 
Notes:  
3.  See Notes to Figure 2.  
4.  This Table shows the points indicated on Figure 2 corresponding to employee cost sharing of 100%, 50% and the current level of employee contributions.  We show only insurance rates for 








Single Affordability  Family 
Affordability 
Difference 
Current  5,803,944 7,092,138  -1,288,195
50%  7,120,189 13,109,899  -5,989,710
100%  9,870,451 14,748,991  -4,878,541
Notes: See notes to Figure 2. 
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Table 4: Number of Workers and Number of Dependents in “No-Man’s Land” 
Under Single Affordability Definitions  




Number of Workers 
with Unaffordable 
Family Coverage 











Current 2,561,827  0  2,561,827  7,542,726
50% 6,951,141  390,401  6,560,740  16,063,536
100% 7,643,769  3,948,638  3,695,131  10,841,965
 




Number of Workers 
with Unaffordable 
Family Coverage 











Current 1,371,445  0  1,371,445  4,017,351
50% 6,153,640  370,026  5,783,614  12,657,387
100% 7,301,848  3,654,658  3,647,189  9,881,903
Notes 
 
1.  See notes to Figure 3 
2.  Panel A assumes no change in take-up of CHIP among children; Panel B assumes that all children eligible for CHIP but not signed up will have CHIP as an affordable source of coverage. 











1.See notes to Figure 3.  
2. Being in “no-man’s land” is defined as having affordable single coverage but unaffordable family coverage. When employee contributions are approximately 15 %, some workers’ family coverage 
becomes unaffordable. When employee contributions are approximately 35%, some workers’ single coverage becomes unaffordable, allowing them to escape “no-man’s land”. Thus, this Figure 
shows the two separate forces behind the graph in Figure 3. 